I. INTRODUCTION
As interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) means that States cannot lawfully grant immunity beyond what is strictly required by international law. 2 The right is not an exception to the law of immunity, but a limitation on domestic courts' discretion on the exercise of jurisdiction. Article 47(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter), which is applicable to EU Member States when they are implementing or giving effect to EU law, contains a right of access to a court identical to that of Article 6(1) ECHR. Consequently, claimants seeking to enforce rights derived from the EU before UK courts can now rely on Article 47(2) of the Charter to require UK courts to examine whether the grant of immunity under the State Immunity Act 1998 (SIA) or the common law gives effect to an international obligation to grant immunity, and if not, to require the domestic grant of immunity to be set aside. 3 The first immunity case to rely on the right of access to a court under the EU Charter is Benkharbouche v Sudan, which involved employment claims by domestic service staff against the London embassies of Sudan and Libya respectively. 4 The English Court of Appeal ruled that, as the scope of the provisions of the SIA granting immunity to these States was not strictly required by international law, they conflicted with the complainants' right of access to a court and, pursuant to the rule that EU law must be given priority over inconsistent domestic law, cannot be applied. The decision has raised a few eyebrows because it is providing that it 'shall have the same legal value as the Treaties'. The Charter rights are applicable to-that is, they bind-the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, and the EU Member States when they are implementing Union law. 10 As the CJEU has explained: '[t]he applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter'. are given direct legal effect within UK law. 13 As Article 6(1) TEU stipulates that the Charter has the same legal effect as the EU treaties, the result is that UK courts must now give legal effect to directly effective Charter rights 14 when applying or interpreting EU law in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of the EC Act.
This includes circumstances in which courts are applying or interpreting UK legislation that seeks to give effect to EU rights or obligations. Crucially for immunity cases, in situations where the SIA conflicts with the right of access to a court under the Charter, section 2(4) of the EC Act would require UK courts to give priority to the Charter right and set aside conflicting provisions of the SIA. 8 Art 52(7) EU Charter, art 6(1) TEU. 9 12 The UK ratified the Treaty of Lisbon by enacting the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008, which amended section 1(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 to include the Treaty of Lisbon as one of the list of treaties that must be given effect in UK law. 13 Section 2(1) EC Act stipulates that they 'are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly'. 14 It is not clear that all Charter rights have direct effect, or which rights have direct effect and which require further legislation before they can be applied by domestic courts. In Association de Mediation Sociale [2014] ECR I-000, the CJEU ruled 'it is clear from the wording of art 27 of the Charter that, for this article to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in European Union or national law' (para 45 National courts must therefore ensure that domestic legislation giving effect to EU law is compatible with the general principles of EU law, which includes setting aside incompatible domestic law. 20 In the UK, the judicial power to do so is provided by section 2(1) of the EC Act, which stipulates that all directly effective EU law should be given legal effect in UK law, and section 2(4), which has been interpreted to mean that directly effective EU law takes priority over incompatible Acts of Parliament.
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Although the CJEU was accused of judicial activism in Mangold, and of applying a general principle 'to the detriment of a private party', 22 it nevertheless adopted the same reasoning in Kücükdeveci. 23 In that case, which was heard after the The decision in AMS therefore suggests that only some Charter rights are general principles of EU law directly effective in national legal systems. In determining which rights are general principles of the EU law, national courts will no doubt have to rely on the Charter Explanations and the jurisprudence of the CJEU.
In summary, under the terms of the EC Act, (1) the Charter-having the status of a EU treaty-is given direct effect within UK law, and (2) Charter rights, insofar as they reflect general principles of EU law, are directly effective as such. However, in both instances, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU Charter are only applicable when the UK is giving effect to EU rights or obligations.
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B. The Right of Access to a Court
The Charter does not expressly set out a right of access to a court, but Article 47, which is based on Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, implies such a right. Article 6(1) ECHR, it follows that the right of access to a court is also an inherent element of the fair trial guarantees in that article. However, Article 47(2) is not confined to civil law rights and obligations and criminal charges: it applies to any and all rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law, and is engaged whenever Member
States are applying or giving effect to EU law. 
B. Challenging the State Immunity Act
The claimants argued that the grant of immunity under the SIA infringed their right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6(1) ECHR and, in respect of the employment claims involving EU law, by Article 47 of the EU Charter. Lloyd Jones LJ began by observing that there are divergent approaches to the question whether State immunity is actually a restriction on the right of access to a court. 40 The ECtHR has always treated immunity as prima facie interfering with the right of access to a court.
However, there is some divergent authority in English courts that suggests the right of access to a court is not even engaged where international law requires States to grant immunity because the grant of immunity deprives the courts of jurisdiction ab initio.
In the impression is created that immunity has value per se, whereas in reality it is an exception to a normative rule which would otherwise apply. It reflects, therefore, an interest which in certain circumstances prevails over an otherwise predominant interest, it is an exception to jurisdiction which normally can be exercised and it can only be invoked when the latter exists. It represents an interest of its own that must always be balanced, however, against the interest of that norm to which it is an exception. concluded that such a literal interpretation of Article 11(2)(b)(iv) would 'run plainly contrary to the rationale for the restrictive wording of Article 11(2)(b)(i)' (which makes special provision for a diplomatic agent) and the travaux préparatoires, which demonstrate that Article 11(2)(b) 'was not intended to require immunity in respect of employment claims by all members of a mission'. 69 Therefore, not only is it questionable whether Article 11 reflects customary international law, but a reasonable interpretation of that provision indicates that it does not require the scope of immunity provided by the effect of section 16(1)(a). 
Section 4(2)(b) SIA
Lloyd Jones LJ also concluded that section 4(2)(b) SIA, which grants State immunity under UK domestic law if the employee was not habitually resident when the contract was made or carried out, was not required by customary international law. This provision implements the UK's obligation under Article 5(2)(b) of the ECSI, which grants immunity to States in employment disputes if 'at the time when the contract was entered into the individual was neither a national of the State of the forum nor habitually resident in that State'. As neither Libya nor Sudan was a contracting party to the ECSI, the question remained whether customary international law itself required immunity in such circumstances. However, it is not clear that even if the defendant State were party to the ECSI that the grant of immunity by a UK court 76 See eg practice discussed in Benkharbouche (n 4) paras 43-44, Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of 1981, section 5 (South Africa) and State Immunity Ordinance 1981, sections 6 and 17(1)(a) (Pakistan). 77 The Court also did not outline the criteria for identifying customary international law. 78 The 'tenable view' approach has been adopted by some UK judges when assessing whether a decision-makers' reliance on an unincorporated treaty provision has given rise to a legitimate expectation that the decision-maker act in accordance with the correct interpretation of that provision. Mance, writing for the Supreme Court, held that a court has discretion to choose not to set aside domestic statutes where to do so would require the court to effectively design a new statutory scheme. 93 The reason for this is that both as a matter of EU law and under section 2(4) of the EU Act, a national court is only required to give effect to EU law 'within the limits of its jurisdiction'. In Chester, which concerned prisoners' voting rights, those limits were defined by the constitutional principles underpinning the separation of powers doctrine, 94 which led the Supreme Court to conclude that it was not institutionally competent to 'devise an alternative scheme of voting eligibility that would or might pass muster in a domestic or supra-national that the 'scope of disapplication in this case is clear', 96 and sections 16(1)(a) and 4(2)(b) SIA should therefore be set aside pursuant to section 2 of the EC Act.
V. CONCLUSION
The Benkharbouche decision provides a careful and welcome examination of State immunity in employment cases involving domestic service members of an embassy.
The Court's conclusion that immunity is not required by customary international law on the facts of Benkharbouche is surely correct, even if the Court perhaps went too far in stating that the UK's position is not even within the range of tenable views.
However, the Court's analysis of the right of access to a court-particularly its application of Article 47 of the Charter-is less convincing. Contrary to the analysis set out by the Court, a more convincing interpretation of sovereign immunity is that it bars, but does not remove ab initio, the jurisdiction of a court. The right of access to a court is breached by the forum State whenever a court declines to exercise jurisdiction it otherwise possesses. Article 47 does have an indirect effect on the parties to the original dispute in that it lifts the bar to the court's jurisdiction, but it cannot properly be understood as placing the forum State in breach of international law, notwithstanding the diplomatic consternation that it may cause.
